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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article proposes turning plea bargaining into a dialogical
process, which would result in lessening a defendant’s sense of
alienation during the progress of the criminal justice procedure.
To say that plea bargaining “is an essential component of the
administration of justice” 1 is a trite understatement. Plea bargaining
*Professor of Law, College of Law and Business, Ramat Gan, Israel. I thank Boaz Sangero, A.M.
Goldstein and Alexandria Ashley Johnson for their helpful comments.
1. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
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affects every aspect of the criminal justice system; 2 it constitutes to a
large extent the course of criminal justice today. 3 Most trials are
withdrawn, and the vast majority of convictions are attained through
plea bargaining. 4 It is not surprising then, that the United States Supreme
Court attaches procedural protections to the plea bargaining process,
such as the right to effective assistance of counsel. 5
Plea bargaining sparks vehement debate among scholars. Some
scholars argue, for various reasons, that plea bargaining should be
abolished, and that the criminal justice system can fare better without
this practice. 6 Despite this criticism, the criminal justice system’s
dependence on plea bargaining to resolve cases implies that it will
constitute a mainstay of the criminal justice system for the foreseeable
future. 7 Any attempt to reform the system, therefore, should take into
account the significance of the practice of plea bargaining. 8 Accordingly,
this Article accepts plea bargaining as a given and seeks to improve its
practice. This Article argues that plea bargaining constitutes an
2. Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives
to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 932 (1983).
3. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909,
1912 (1992) (stating that “it is the criminal justice system.”); Stephanos Bibas, Judicial FactFinding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1150 (2001)
(stating that “[o]ur world is no longer one of trials, but of guilty pleas.”).
4. John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 9 (1978); Markus
Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains, German Lay Judges, and the Crisis of Criminal
Procedure, 49 STAN. L. REV. 547, 551-52 (1997); Bibas, supra note 3, at 1100. See especially
Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (stating that “ninety-seven percent of federal
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”).
5. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); Missouri, 132 S. Ct. at 1407-08; Lafler v.
Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). See generally, Peter A. Joy & Rodney J. Uphoff, Systemic Barriers
to Effective Assistance of Counsel in Plea Bargaining, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2103 (2014).
6. Alschuler, supra note 2, at 931-34; Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea
Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 52 (1968) [hereinafter The Prosecutor’s Role]; Albert
W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L. J. 1179, 1180 (1975)
[hereinafter The Defense Attorney’s Role]; See generally Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea
Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652 (1981); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea
Bargaining Inevitable? 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1037 (1984); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea
Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1979-80 (1992); Jeff Palmer, Note, Abolishing Plea
Bargaining: An End to the Same Old Song and Dance, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 505, 508 (1999); See
generally Tina Wan, Note, The Unnecessary Evil of Plea Bargaining: An Unconstitutional
Conditions Problem and a Not-So-Least Restrictive Alternative, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 33
(2007). See also Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2299300 (2006) (suggesting a ban on plea bargaining in weak cases by prohibiting plea bargains that
offer excessive concessions to defendants).
7. Dubber, supra note 4, at 552; Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TUL. L.
REV. 695, 700, 706 (2001) (stating, “In fact, some would argue that the battle against plea
bargaining has been lost.”).
8. Dubber, supra note 4, at 552.
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opportunity to circumvent the restrictions that exist during a trial or
outside a trial, such as the inadmissibility of character evidence, and the
need for the victim’s consent in restorative justice proceedings. This
Article proposes to navigate the plea bargaining process in a way that
creates a real dialogue with defendants. Such a dialogue can reduce the
sense of alienation that defendants feel from their position as a
defendant. To accomplish this dialogue, the prosecutor conducting the
plea bargaining negotiations must be a different person than the
prosecutor in the trial if negotiations break down.
This Article is presented in seven parts which are described as
follows: Part II centers on a defendant’s sense of alienation within the
criminal justice system in general and within the plea bargaining process
in particular. Meursault, the protagonist of Albert Camus’ famous
novella, The Stranger (or The Outsider), 9 serves throughout this Article
as an example of a defendant who is excluded from his criminal justice
process. Part III discusses the reasons for excluding character evidence
from a trial. While justifying this rule, this Part defines its costs, using
the figure of Meursault to exemplify the disadvantages of entering
character evidence into trial. Part IV suggests making room for dialogue
within the plea bargaining process in which a prosecutor, who is not in
charge of conducting the trial against the defendant, would communicate
the attitude of the prosecution regarding the seriousness of the offense,
the harm caused to the victim and to society at large, and the
prosecution’s initial position on the appropriate sentence. The defendant
would then have the opportunity to present reasons for committing the
offense, any remorse, and any feelings regarding the victim. In addition,
the defendant can maintain innocence, assert that the offense committed
or the degree of his culpability is less serious than that of the charge, or
point to any mitigating circumstances. Part V explores the possibility of
partially securing the ends of restorative justice through mutual
prosecutor-defendant dialogue. Part VI comes to grips with possible
drawbacks of the dialogue suggestion. Finally, Part VII presents the
conclusions.
II. SENSE OF ALIENATION
Empirical studies point to satisfaction with treatment as a key factor
in evaluating the performance and legitimacy of legal authorities. 10 The
more a person experiences the process as fair, the easier it is to accept
9.
10.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015

ALBERT CAMUS, THE STRANGER (Stuart Gilbert trans., 1962).
TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 96-97, 103-08 (2006).

3

Akron Law Review, Vol. 49 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 2
02 KITAI-SANGERO - MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

66

AKRON LAW REVIEW

11/16/2015 1:20 PM

[49:63

the legal decision. 11 The criminal justice process should not only give
defendants fair treatment, but it should also make them feel that they
received fair treatment. Treating defendants with respect has a
therapeutic effect: defendants are willing more readily to accept
responsibility for their behavior and even to modify it. 12 Research shows
that meaningful participation by the accused person in the criminal
justice process dramatically increases that individual’s sense of fair
treatment independently of the final outcome of the trial. 13 The feeling
that one’s voice was heard—that there was the opportunity to present
arguments and be listened to—bears heavily on a defendant’s evaluation
of the proceedings. 14 There is a connection between a sense of fair
treatment, including having one’s views considered, and the sense of
control on the final decision. 15 In assessing the fairness of the process,
accused persons give weight both to respect for their rights and to
respect for them as human beings. 16 The message then conveyed is that
one is a member of the community. 17
A full criminal trial is certainly an unattractive option in terms of
the defendant’s degree of participation. Many defendants do not testify
at trial, and as a result, their version of events is rarely heard.18
Furthermore, defendants sometimes appear isolated because the focus of
the trial is on their lawyers. 19
From a normative point of view, defendants want to be listened to,
and a defendant should participate in the criminal process “as an active
subject, not merely as a passive object.” 20 Meursault was frustrated
because nobody seemed to be interested in his testimony. After his
lawyer advised him not to talk at the trial, he felt that “there seemed to
be a conspiracy to exclude me from the proceedings; I wasn’t to have
11. TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 130 (2002); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE
COOPERATE: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MOTIVATIONS 128-131 (2011).
12. Amy D. Ronner, Dostoyevsky and the Therapeutic Jurisprudence Confession, 40 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 41, 101 (2006).
13. Id. at 49-50.
14. Stefan Trechsel, Why Must Trials Be Fair? 31 ISR. L. REV. 94, 119 (1997); Richard B.
Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural
Protection, 127 PA. L. REV. 111, 122-23 (1978); Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, Drug
Treatment Court: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Applied, 16 TOURO L. REV. 479, 482 (2002).
15. TYLER, supra note 10, at 137.
16. Id. at 138.
17. Id. at 150.
18. Gordon Van Kessel, European Perspectives on the Accused as a Source of Testimonial
Evidence, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 799, 800 (1998).
19. Id. at 839.
20. R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 39 (1986).
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any say and my fate was to be decided out of hand.” 21 Occasionally, he
wanted to express his frustration: “But, damn it all, who’s on trial in this
court, I’d like to know? It’s a serious matter for a man, being accused of
murder. And I’ve something really important to tell you.” 22
It is only natural that representation by a lawyer, who speaks on
behalf of the defendant, in a legal language that the latter does not
understand, would alienate the defendant from the legal process despite
the many advantages of such representation. 23 This sense of alienation
then makes it difficult for defendants to recognize the justice of their
conviction. 24
Jonathan Casper succinctly describes the feelings of the defendant
following an encounter with the criminal justice system:
When he does get caught, and “they” punish him, he discovers that
they really don’t care very much about him. He is a nuisance, and they
treat him as though they would some incidental bother distracting them
from going about their lives. His interaction with the law—in which he
finds himself an object in the hands of those who simply wish to get
rid of him—enforces his own image of himself as an outsider and as a
25
“bad person.”

When plea bargaining is concerned, defendants often feel that the
procedure stems from the needs of the criminal justice system rather
than their own personal needs. 26 Nevertheless, defendants are not of the
opinion that plea bargaining is less fair than a trial. 27 It may be that this
procedure gives more space to the defendant’s interpersonal concerns.28
The experience of loss of control is difficult, and defendants naturally
want to decrease this feeling. Defendants want to affect their sentence in
some way. Having no patience to wait for the outcome of a trial, they
want their counsel to speak to the prosecutor. But what is the counsel
supposed to talk about if the defendant is guilty of the charges against
him and does not deny culpability? Is the prosecutor interested in
listening to the defendant or to this person’s counsel and in promoting
honest dialogue before a trial? Should the prosecutor be interested in
21. CAMUS, supra note 9, at 124.
22. Id.
23. Raymond Koen, The Antinomies of Restorative Justice, 2007 ACTA JURIDICA 247, 253
(2007).
24. DUFF, supra note 20, at 142.
25. JONATHAN D. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE DEFENDANT’S PERSPECTIVE
165 (1972).
26. Id. at 18.
27. TYLER, supra note 10, at 154.
28. Id. at 155.
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doing so?
It is claimed that one of the advantages of plea bargaining is that
“of tailoring sentencing to the needs of individual defendants.” 29
Moreover, plea bargaining allows defendants to actively take part in the
determination of their sentence and, consequently, engenders in them
feelings of dignity and a sense of self-worth. 30 Casper posits that most
guilty defendants normally recognize the wrongness of their behavior.31
They are less willing to participate in determining their sentence, but
rather want someone to help extricate them from the cycle of crime and
to lead normal lives.32 Plea bargaining as dialogue can promote all these
goals.
III. CHARACTER EVIDENCE
A. Character Evidence in Camus’ The Stranger
Plea bargaining as dialogue enables the defendant to introduce
herself to the prosecutor and to sidestep the almost total lack of reference
to positive traits of the accused’s personality during the criminal justice
process.
Subject to known exceptions, the common law bars the prosecution
from admitting character evidence to prove the charges against the
defendant. 33 Albert Camus’ novella, The Stranger, illustrates the
shortcomings of introducing character evidence.
Meursault, the protagonist, was charged with the murder of an Arab
(whose name is not mentioned) at the beach. This Arab had previously
attacked Meursault’s friend. After seeing a knife in the Arab’s hand and
while blinded by the sun, Meursault fired one bullet, which killed the
attacker. Then, in the heat of a trance, he fired four more shots into the
29. CASPER, supra note 25, at 93.
30. Id. at 94 (citing Arnold Enker, Perspectives on Plea-Bargaining, President’s Commission
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Courts, 116 (1967). See
also Talia Fisher, The Boundaries of Plea Bargaining: Negotiating the Standard of Proof, 97 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 943, 944-45 (2007) (stating that “in addition to their attributed
efficiency, plea bargaining practices can be normatively anchored in the defendant’s autonomy of
will, and in his right to effective control of his fate.”).
31. Id. at 97, 146.
32. CASPER, supra note 25, at 97.
33. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948); Martin F. Kaplan, Character
Testimony 150, 150-51, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE (Saul M. Kassin
& Lawrence S. Wrightsman eds., 1985); Kenneth J. Melilli, The Character Evidence Rule
Revisited, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1547. Rule 404(a) states that “evidence of a person’s character
or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on
a particular occasion.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(a).
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inert body.
During Meursault’s trial, his character and his treatment of his
mother, especially the fact that he had not cried at his mother’s funeral,
became the focal point of the proceedings and was taken as an indication
of his guilt as a murderer. The presiding judge, while interviewing
Meursault privately in his office, admitted that he strove to get to know
the character of the accused: “What really interests me is—you!” 34 The
judge also asked Meursault whether he had loved his mother 35 and
whether he believed in God. 36
In the Assize court where Meursault’s trial was held, the presiding
judge asked him questions that “might seem foreign to the case, but
actually were highly relevant,” 37 such as why had he sent his mother to a
home for the elderly and whether parting from his mother hard for him. 38
The warden of the home for the elderly testified to Meursault’s calmness
during his mother’s funeral, noting that he had refused to look at his
mother’s corpse and that he did not even remember his mother’s age.39
The doorkeeper of the home testified that Meursault had smoked
cigarettes and drank coffee during the night he sat near his mother’s
coffin. 40 The old man who had been his mother’s friend testified that he
did not notice Meursault crying; however, he hardly ever noticed him
and could not testify whether he had or had not cried.41 Meursault’s
defense counsel remarked on this person’s testimony: “That is typical of
the way this case is being conducted. No attempt is being made to elicit
the true facts.” 42 Céleste, the owner of the restaurant where Meursault
used to dine, testified that Meursault was “all right.” 43 The judge,
however, did not allow Céleste to dwell on this testimony. 44 When
Marie, Meursault’s lover, testified, the prosecutor tried to prove that her
relationship with the accused had begun the day after Meursault’s
mother’s funeral. 45 Upon the conclusion of her testimony, the prosecutor
made the following innuendo: “Gentlemen of the jury, I would have you
note that on the next day after his mother’s funeral that man was visiting
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
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the swimming pool, starting a liaison with a girl, and going to see a
comic film. That is all I wish to say.” 46
After that remark, nobody seemed to listen to the next witness on
behalf of Meursault. 47 His defense counsel tried in vain to protest the
prosecution’s conclusion, asking, “[I]s my client on trial for having
buried his mother, or for killing a man?” 48 The prosecutor responded to
this challenge by insisting that there was “a vital link” between the two
events and declaring, “I accuse the prisoner of behaving at his mother’s
funeral in a way that showed he was already a criminal at heart.” 49 As
Meursault later related, the prosecutor’s summing up to the jury
“stressed my heartlessness, my inability to state Mother’s age, my visit
to the swimming pool where a Fernandel film was showing, and finally
my return with Marie to my rooms.” 50 The prosecutor had also stressed
Meursault’s education and intelligence to prove premeditation, causing
Meursault to wonder how a good trait like intelligence militated against
a defendant as proof of guilt. 51 The prosecutor further called Meursault
“an inhuman monster wholly without a moral sense” 52 and depicted him
as a person with no soul, inhuman, devoid of “those moral qualities
which normal men possess,” 53 lacking “every decent instinct,” and
constituting “a menace to society.” 54 The prosecutor’s excessive
characterization of the accused reached its peak when he compared
Meursault’s callousness to patricide, a crime for which another person
was supposed to be brought to trial the next day. “This man, who is
morally guilty of his mother’s death,” the prosecutor charged, “is no less
unfit to have a place in the community than that other man who did to
death the father that begat him. And, indeed, the one crime led on to the
other; the first of these two criminals, the man in the dock, set a
precedent, if I may put it so, and authorized the second crime.” 55 The
comparison, he made it clear, lead to but one conclusion: “I am
convinced . . . that you will not find I am exaggerating the case against
the prisoner when I say that he is also guilty of the murder to be tried

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 118.
Id. at 119.
Id. at 121.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 127.
Id.
Id. at 128.
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tomorrow in this court, and I look to you for a verdict accordingly.” 56
It was Meursault’s personality that was on trial, not any purported
act. As he described the proceedings: “[A]nd certainly in the speeches of
my lawyer and the prosecuting counsel a great deal was said about me;
more, in fact, about me personally than about my crime.” 57 The
prosecutor claimed that he had succeeded in penetrating Meursault’s
soul, 58 but the defense counsel used the same tactic: “I, too . . . have
closely studied this man’s soul; but, unlike my learned friend for the
prosecution, I have found something there. Indeed, I may say that I have
read the prisoner’s mind like an open book.” He found Meursault to be
“an excellent young fellow, a steady, conscientious worker who did his
best by his employer . . . was popular with everyone and sympathetic in
other’s troubles . . . a dutiful son . . . .” 59 Actually, no one had made any
effort to understand Meursault’s inner world view. 60 His personality,
though it had been the focus of the legal proceedings, was simply
eradicated.
The Stranger illustrates how relying on character evidence to
decide guilt or innocence is problematic. Numerous justifications have
been provided for prohibiting character evidence. This Article analyzes
their central arguments with the aid of Camus’ The Stranger.
B. Justifications for the Character Evidence Prohibition
1. Character Evidence Possesses Little Probative Value
The United States Supreme Court has excluded character evidence
“despite its admitted probative value.” 61 Nevertheless, scholars have
found the probative value of character evidence to be doubtful. 62
Unfaithfulness to a spouse, friends, or one’s place of work, for example,

56. Id.
57. Id. at 123.
58. Id. at 127.
59. Id. at 131.
60. Robert Batey, Literature in a Criminal Law Course: Aeschylus, Burgess, Oates, Camus,
Poe, and Melville, 22 LEGAL STUD. FORUM 45, 71 (1998) (regarding the judge).
61. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948).
62. Miguel Angel Mendez, California’s New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence Code
Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1003, 1005 (1984);
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Use of Evidence of an Accused’s Uncharged Misconduct to Prove Mens
Rea: The Doctrines That Threaten to Engulf the Character Evidence Prohibition, 130 MIL. L. REV.
41, 49 (1990); Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 1227, 1234 (2001).
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does not bear on criminal activities. 63 Although there are situations in
which character evidence is relevant, 64 character evidence is excluded
because its slight probative value does not in the majority of cases justify
its costs. 65
2. Character Evidence is Prejudicial
Character evidence is claimed to be prejudicial to the defendant. 66
The jury may, in overestimating the evidence, assume that if the
defendant had once committed a crime, he may repeat criminal acts.67
Based to a large extent on the assumption that “once a criminal, always a
criminal,” 68 character evidence may create a presumption of guilt and
weaken the presumption of innocence, 69 and it violates the defendant’s
dignity and autonomy to choose to refrain from committing offenses. 70
Character evidence that is negative may arouse the jury’s hostility
toward the defendant and cause them to decide the case on the basis of
the defendant’s character regardless of whether he is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged. 71 The jury may simply think that the
defendant deserves punishment because of his bad character. 72 If,
moreover, the jury is persuaded that the defendant has committed
uncharged crimes, they may feel that justice would be done by a
63. Mendez, supra note 62, at 1019.
64. Peter Tillers, What Is Wrong with Character Evidence? 49 HASTINGS L.J. 781, 785
(1998) (stating that “a considerable amount of character evidence has a substantial amount of
probative value.”).
65. James Landon, Note, Character Evidence: Getting to the Root of the Problem Through
Comparison, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 581, 596 (1997).
66. Mendez, supra note 62, at 1006, 1044 (stating that “[p]sychological studies confirm the
intuitive belief that character evidence can be highly prejudicial.”); Donald M.
Houser, Reconciling Ring v. Arizona with the Current Structure of the Federal Capital Murder
Trial: The Case for Trifurcation, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 349, 369 (2007).
67. Mendez, supra note 62, at 1007, 1042; Imwinkelried, supra note 62, at 51.
68. Colin Miller, Impeachable Offenses?: Why Civil Parties in Quasi-Criminal Cases Should
Be Treated Like Criminal Defendants Under the Felony Impeachment Rule, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 997,
1002 (2009).
69. Landon, supra note 65, at 592; Josephine Ross, “He Looks Guilty”: Reforming Good
Character Evidence to Undercut the Presumption of Guilt, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 227, 228 (2004).
70. Tillers, supra note 64, at 795 n. 32; ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 32
(2005).
71. Mendez, supra note 62, at 1006; Jeffrey Omar Usman, Ancient and Modern Character
Evidence: How Character Evidence Was Used in Ancient Athenian Trials, Its Uses in the United
States, and What This Means for How These Democratic Societies Understand the Role of Jurors,
33 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 1, 30 (2008); Barrett J. Anderson, Note, Recognizing Character: A New
Perspective on Character Evidence, 121 YALE L.J. 1912, 1929 (2012).
72. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181 (1997); Mendez, supra note 62, at 1007;
Landon, supra note 65, at 589.
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conviction for the current offense regardless of the evidence.73 Character
evidence enhances, therefore, the risk of convicting an innocent person
who has a criminal history. 74 Additionally, the very fact that the
defendant has been charged may affect the jury’s perception of the
defendant’s personality: it makes it easier for the jury to believe the bad
character evidence rather than the good.75 In The Stranger, the
prosecutor succeeded in depicting Meursault as possessing a criminal
mind and persuaded the jury that the accused’s indifference toward his
mother shed light on his motive to kill. Meursault’s indifference toward
his mother became more meaningful than the crime he had allegedly
committed. He was sentenced to death because of what was viewed as
his heartlessness toward his mother. His trial was effectually turned into
a case of matricide.
3. The Ability to Become Acquainted with a Person’s Character
It is very easy to maneuver character evidence. We can say one
thing and its opposite about almost every person. For example, we may
know a person in one particular aspect of her life as an employee, as an
employer, or as a colleague, but chances are that we do not know how
she behaves at home. Additionally, humans are complex. A pleasant
person can be a swindler. A pleasant man at work can treat his wife and
children abusively. People also may or may not act in conformity with
their character. 76
Moreover, it is very doubtful whether we can become acquainted
with a person’s character. In regard to Meursault, for example, all
readers are given the same information about him; however, scholars
have different evaluations of his personality.
Thus, Camus himself views his protagonist as a person whose main
problem is that he does not play society’s game. 77 Weisberg views
Meursault as a “working man, straightforward and mildly intelligent
whose main defects are an inability to use words in a socially acceptable
way and a concomitant susceptibility to purely naturalistic influences.” 78

73. Imwinkelried, supra note 62, at 48.
74. Katherine J. Strandburg, Deterrence and the Conviction of Innocents, 35 CONN. L. REV.
1321, 1339 (2003).
75. Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly
Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497, 525 (1983).
76. STEIN, supra note 70, at 183-84.
77. 8 RAYMOND GAY-CROSIER, LITERARY MASTERPIECES: THE STRANGER 66 (2002).
78. RICHARD H. WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD: THE PROTAGONIST AS LAWYER IN
MODERN FICTION 116 (1984).
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According to Richard Weisberg, Meursault is a little bit bizarre, nonconformist, but has no moral aberration, and is certainly not a monster. 79
Nevertheless, “during the legal process, Meursault’s non-malicious and
even admirable economy of sentiment is transformed into a serialized
portrait of a ‘monstrous’ individual.” 80 Weisberg concludes that in an
American court, where character evidence is inadmissible, “Meursault
might have received a relatively light sentence for manslaughter.” 81
As opposed to Weisberg, Judge Richard Posner estimates
differently both Meursault’s character and the outcome of the trial had
character evidence been excluded. According to Posner, Meursault is
devoid of a conscience 82 and lacks an inner conversation between the
different parts of the self. 83 As to the outcome of the trial, Posner
believes that since Meursault did not feel threatened by his victim and
since the four shots he fired into the inert body is evidence of
premeditation, Meursault’s conviction of murder would have remained
intact even had his character not been placed as an issue at trial.84 Posner
treats Meursault as a loathsome and “too dangerous to leave at large”
offender. 85 In his view, extolling Meursault is even immoral: “Indeed,
could it not be thought shameful of Camus to invite the reader to take
Meursault’s part by depicting him as victim rather than killer and by
depersonalizing the real victim? Not only shameful, but incoherent?”86
One further point is that a person may also not know himself. Being
aware of his complexity, he may not always characterize himself as
patient or impatient, generous or stingy. He is aware of the fact of being
able to behave in one way or another in the same situation. 87 Expert
character testimony, therefore, would be of no avail to shed light on his
personality. 88

79. Richard H. Weisberg, Comparative Law in Comparative Literature: The Figure of the
“Examining Magistrate” in Dostoevski and Camus, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 237, 258 (1976). See also
WEISBERG, supra note 78, at 116, 121.
80. WEISBERG, supra note 78, at 121.
81. Id. at 121-22.
82. RICHARD H. POSNER, LAW & LITERATURE 60 (3d ed., 2009).
83. Id. at 64.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 65.
86. Id.
87. See Kaplan, supra note 33, at 158 (stating that “people are inconsistent in their behavior.
Traits change over time, and the same traits operate differently in different contexts.”).
88. For a suggestion on the use of expert character testimony in trials, see Andrew E. Taslitz,
Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice Through Psychological Character Evidence, 52 MD. L. REV.
1, 4 (1991).
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4. Shifting the Focus and Consuming Time
Admitting character evidence may turn this kind of evidence into
the centerpiece of the trial, thereby diverting attention away from the
offense committed to the defendant’s general character.89 Another
disadvantage is that admitting character evidence can be extremely time
and resource consuming; 90 in fact, entering character evidence into the
trial may result in the proceedings becoming a never-ending trial. Every
person who met the defendant at one time in his life may offer character
evidence as Masson, one of the witnesses in The Stranger, actually did.
The question of whether the defendant committed, say, a robbery is quite
limited. But how can we stop testimony about one’s character? Wasting
the court’s time in this way should be prohibited, not least owing to
considerations of efficiency.
C. Against Anonymity
Despite the strong arguments to the contrary, exclusion of character
evidence is also problematic. Good character evidence humanizes the
defendant. 91 A feeling that character does not matter may create
alienation and bitterness toward the criminal justice system. Conducting
a trial without any reference to the defendant’s character may turn the
defendant into a number.
Jeffrey Murphy distinguishes between retributive punishment based
on the seriousness of the offense and its circumstances and retributive
punishment based on the defendant’s character. 92 The latter assumes the
possibility of distinguishing between the offense and the offender, 93 and
that “an error can be forgiven if it is seen as ‘out of character.’” 94 And,
indeed, a person’s good character, which includes the absence of a
criminal history and contribution to society, is taken into account as a
mitigating factor in sentencing. 95 According to the Sentencing
89.
90.
91.
92.

Landon, supra note 65, at 594-95.
Mendez, supra note 62, at 1006; Anderson, supra note 71, at 1930.
Ross, supra note 69, at 270.
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment 14, 43 in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN
HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY (1988). See also JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL LAW 213-14 (6th ed. 2012).
93. Hagit Benbaji & David Heyd, The Charitable Perspective: Forgiveness and Toleration
as Supererogatory, 31 CAN. J. PHIL. 567, 571-72 (2001).
94. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 496
(1997).
95. On taking into consideration the lack of a criminal record, see Andrew von Hirsch, Doing
Justice: The Principle of Commensurate Deserts 243, 244, in SENTENCING (Hyman Gross &
Andrew von Hirsch eds., 1981). On considering character evidence in sentencing, see Sanchirico,
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Guidelines, acceptance of responsibility is also a mitigating factor.96
During the sentencing phase, the judge is exposed to the defendant’s
character through the probation officer’s report. 97 However, reference to
the defendant’s character should begin at an earlier stage of the criminal
justice process.
Meursault’s trial stands in stark contrast to the process that
characterized the trial of Galin E. Frye of Missouri. 98 Frye’s case
illustrates an extreme situation of excluding the defendant from his own
legal proceedings. The defendant was charged with driving with a
revoked license. 99 Because Frye had already been convicted of this
offense three times in the past, the State of Missouri now accused him of
a class D felony, which is punishable by a maximum of four years in
prison. 100 The prosecutor sent a letter to Frye’s defense counsel offering
the choice of one of two suggestions, both of them a take it or leave it
deal. One suggestion was that Frye would admit to a felony offense
punishable by a maximum of three years imprisonment and serve
“shock” time in jail for ten days. The second suggestion was that Frye
would admit to a misdemeanor offense, which is punishable by
maximum of one-year imprisonment and serve ninety days in jail. 101 The
prosecutor added that the offers would expire on a certain date. Frye’s
lawyer did not inform him of the offers, which were subsequently
withdrawn for lack of the defendant’s consent. 102
Frye’s story shows how a defendant in a criminal trial could be
treated as a number rather as a human being. There was only a letter
setting out the offer and a deadline. There was not even a short
conversation with the defendant or his defense counsel before the “offer”
of imprisonment was made. The prosecutor’s suggestions were
unheedful of the defendant’s concerns. Neither Frye’s personality nor
the impact of imprisonment on him and his family apparently concerned
the prosecutor at all. All that mattered was to get rid of the case and to
proceed with other files, hopefully in the same way. Undoubtedly, plea
bargaining of this type, if it can be called that, does not lessen but, on the
contrary, increases the defendant’s feelings of bitterness and frustration
supra note 62, at 1268.
96. Tung Yin, Not a Rotten Carrot: Using Charges Dismissed Pursuant to a Plea Agreement
in Sentencing Under the Federal Guidelines, 83 CAL. L. REV. 419, 434 (1995).
97. CASPER, supra note 25, at 86; Yin, supra note 96, at 448.
98. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
99. Id. at 1404.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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during the criminal justice process. These feelings are probably felt more
keenly when an offer is not even communicated to the defendant.
Some obvious facts should be recalled. The power of the litigating
parties is not equal. 103 “Plea bargain is inherently coercive for the
accused; his ambit of choice is determined by the state.” 104 The
defendant has no choice; she cannot cut herself off from the proceedings,
which are being conducted against her, and is forced to be in some
contact with law enforcement agencies.105
Normally, there are no true negotiations between the prosecutor and
the defendant, represented by a defense counsel. 106 The prosecutor is the
one who dictates the conditions of the agreement. 107 “‘Plea bargaining’
is in reality the prosecutor’s unilateral administrative determination of
the level of the defendant’s criminal culpability and the appropriate
punishment for him.” 108 Even when negotiations occur, they often bear
the character of a poker game. 109
John Griffiths’ family model suggests that one should think of the
relationship between state agents and offenders as a relationship between
parents and children, and offenders should be treated accordingly with
care. 110 Parents, of course, are supposed to speak with their children,
communicate to them the wrongness of their conduct, listen to their
explanations, and respond to them.
IV. DIALOGUE THROUGH PLEA BARGAINING
As we have seen, character evidence may distort justice. A lack of
character evidence, however, strips the defendant of his unique human
characteristics. Plea bargaining as dialogue may sidestep the problem of
character evidence and suggest a middle path between exploring the
defendant’s soul, as illustrated by The Stranger, and addressing the
defendant as a pure number devoid of personality, as reflected in the

103. Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1121, 1134
(1998).
104. Joseph Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity,
Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 699 (1975).
105. Goldstein, supra note 104, at 699; Julian A. Cook, III, All Aboard! The Supreme Court,
Guilty Pleas, and the Railroading of Criminal Defendants, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 863, 908 (2004).
106. Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 45 (1983).
107. Id. at 38.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., The Prosecutor’s Role, supra note 6, at 68.
110. John Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or A Third “Model” of the Criminal
Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359, 379 (1970).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015

15

Akron Law Review, Vol. 49 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 2
02 KITAI-SANGERO - MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

78

AKRON LAW REVIEW

11/16/2015 1:20 PM

[49:63

kind of plea bargaining offered to Galin E. Frye of Missouri. This
intermediate approach is manifested in the conducting of true
negotiations between prosecutor and defendant in which the defendant
and the defense counsel are given the opportunity to present the
defendant’s positive traits.
A defendant’s ability to take an active part in the proceedings
against him maintains the defendant’s dignity as a human being. 111
Scholars view plea bargaining as granting defendants an opportunity to
participate in determining their fate. This description of empowerment,
however, does not accord with reality, in which “plea bargains often
result from a quick phone call or hallway conversation between
prosecutor and defense counsel.” 112 It would be very odd to contend that
Frye was empowered as a result of his plea bargaining experience. It is
more accurate to say that he experienced a sense of disempowerment.
Such an experience also undermines the goals of therapeutic
jurisprudence.
Therapeutic jurisprudence strives to use law “to function as a kind
of therapist or therapeutic agent.” 113 It uses social sciences to examine
how law can promote the physical and psychological well-being of an
individual. 114 However, if the defendant is not involved in the plea
bargaining process, no therapeutic effect can be achieved. 115
Disparity of power between the prosecutor and the accused is
inherent in the criminal process. It is not only the resources available to
law enforcement authorities and their ability to gather evidence that lead
to the disparity. Even when the defendant is a wealthy person, the
imbalance is created from the asymmetry in trial results to the parties.
The defendant is the one who is exposed to the dangers of conviction
and the deprivation of liberty, a situation that makes him most
vulnerable. 116 Therefore, no kind of negotiations would cancel the
disparity in bargaining power between the prosecutor and the defendant.
The defendant, as the one whose life will be affected directly from the
111. STEFAN TRECHSEL, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 247 (2005) (regarding
the right to counsel).
112. John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea
Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 484 (2001).
113. David B. Wexler, An Orientation to Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 20 NEW ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 259, 259 (1994).
114. Trent Oram & Kara Gleckler, An Analysis of the Constitutional Issues Implicated in Drug
Courts, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 471, 474 (2006); David B. Wexler, Two Decades of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, 24 TOURO L. REV. 17, 24 (2009).
115. Wexler, supra note 113, at 261.
116. Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors Seek Justice? 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 626
(1999).
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outcome of the trial, has simply much more to lose.
Still, negotiations that enable a defendant to express his opinions
and wishes places the defendant in a higher status compared to the
accused’s status during pre-trial investigation and the trial itself.117
Israeli Supreme Court Justice Eliyahu Matza has stated that the
adversarial criminal justice system dictates not only a conflict between
the rival parties but also a dialogue between them, which could be
implemented within the framework of plea bargaining. 118 Indeed, the
very dialogue between defendant and prosecution can lead to reducing
the former’s sense of alienation, felt throughout the criminal justice
process.
Dialogue will enable the defendant to freely give his version of the
events. He would then obtain the opportunity to play a meaningful role
during the legal process even if he wanted to waive trial by issuing a
guilty plea.
The United States Supreme Court has attached great importance to
the role that counsel should play in providing mental support for the
defendant. The presence and advice of counsel are supposed to dissipate
the coercive impact of any offer of leniency in return for the defendant’s
guilty plea. 119 The Court, in fact, has held that defendants are entitled to
the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel during plea
negotiations. 120
Since the defense counsel’s main work is conducted with the
prosecutor to obtain a plea bargain, the former should be an effective
negotiator in order to achieve optimal results for the client. 121 During the
negotiations, defense counsel can show to the prosecutor the defendant’s
good traits so that the accused will be able to feel that he is being
addressed as a human being, not as a monster.
Obviously, a serious gap exists between the ideal role of defense
counsel and the way this function is implemented in practice.122 Not only
prosecutors but many defense counsel, as well, assume the defendant’s

117. Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of
Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 37
(2004).
118. Crim. App. 4722/92 Markovitz v. State of Israel, 47(2) P.D. 45, 57 (1993).
119. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 754 (1970).
120. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010).
121. Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systemic
Approach, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 73, 74 (1995).
122. The Defense Attorney’s Role, supra note 6, at 1180; Jenny Roberts, Why
Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 277, 318 (2011) (regarding misdemeanor defense counsel).
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guilt to be undisputed. 123 Defense counsel may even have incentives to
encourage a plea of guilty from the client.124 In addition, defense counsel
are generally overloaded and may have little or no time to spend trying
to understand the defendant’s motives or bothering to present the
defendant’s character and background in the most beneficial way. 125
There are defense counsel who implicitly convey the message that they
are not concerned about their client’s guilt or innocence. 126 No theory
can make a lawyer who does not take into account the interests of the
client be concerned about their client’s guilt or innocence.
Direct dialogue between prosecutor and defendant will enable the
defendant to receive direct information from the prosecutor and help
sidestep any such problems in representation. The defendant, especially
one who does not enjoy zealous representation, could take the
opportunity to be introduced directly to the prosecutor without any
barriers. Speaking up does not require familiarity with substantive or
procedural criminal law. Almost everyone can just relate her side of the
case.
That said, most defense counsel do provide competent
representation. Generally, the skills of public defenders do not fall short
of those of prosecutors. 127 Moreover, many defense counsel do evince
concern about their clients’ welfare and perceive their own role also as a
kind of social worker. 128 They understand that the criminal justice
process may be a traumatic experience for their clients and are inclined
to soften it for them. 129
Competent defense counsel should present the defendant’s personal
story to the prosecutor. Having a good character and leading an honest
life may—not must, of course—prove that the defendant was unlikely to

123. Gifford, supra note 106, at 53. See also BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER,
ACTUAL INNOCENCE 190 (2000) (regarding disbelief of many defense counsel in their client’s
innocence).
124. On these incentives, see Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas,
1999 UTAH L. REV. 205, 238-41; Palmer, supra note 6, at 520-21; F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma
M. Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the Innocent: The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense
Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 189, 219 (2002); Cook, supra note 105, at 901.
125. On overloaded defense counsel who make no effective representation or have only little
time for their clients, see CASPER, supra note 25, at 106; Joy & Uphoff, supra note 5, at 2113-14.
126. The Defense Attorney’s Role, supra note 6 at n. 280.
127. Hon J. Harvie Wilkinson III, In Defense of American Criminal Justice, 67 VAND. L. REV.
1099, 1127-28 (2014).
128. Margareth Etienne, The Declining Utility of the Right to Counsel in Federal Criminal
Courts: An Empirical Study on the Diminished Role of Defense Attorney Advocacy under the
Sentencing Guidelines, 92 CAL. L. REV. 425, 483-84 (2004).
129. Id. at 483-84.
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have engaged in a heinous crime. 130 Even when not a case of innocence,
if the defendant’s attorney had functioned effectively as a negotiator and
presented to the prosecutor data such as the impact of imprisonment on
the defendant and the well-being of his family, there is more of a chance
of receiving better results for the defendant. 131
Because plea bargaining is the most common means of satisfying
criminal justice, the traditional functions of a trial should be moved into
the plea bargaining regime. Indeed, scholars have expressed uneasiness
at the current format of negotiating a plea bargain, which offers
defendants leniency only in exchange for a guilty plea, impliedly
waiving the right to contest the charges and the privilege against selfincrimination. It has been proposed to expand the format of negotiations
to include the conduct of the trial so that, for example, the defendant
would agree to waive some of the procedural rights granted at trial
instead of pleading guilty in exchange for concessions from the
prosecutor. 132
Bibas suggests the interesting possibility of allowing crime victims
to express their feelings and to forgive the offender in appropriate cases
through the plea-bargaining process. Additionally, the victim and the
defendant should have the opportunity to meet and talk during these
proceedings, at which time defendants should have the opportunity to
manifest remorse and offer restitution to victims. 133 This suggestion
leads to the next advantage of plea bargaining as dialogue: securing
some of the aims of restorative justice without depending on the victim’s
attitude toward the defendant.
V. RESTORATIVE JUSTICE THROUGH PLEA BARGAINING
Restorative justice seeks “better ways of doing justice.” 134 Aiming
at reconciliation between the parties and repair of the harm caused, it

130. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948) (stating that the defendant
“may introduce affirmative testimony that the general estimate of his character is so favorable that
the jury may infer that he would not be likely to commit the offense charged. This privilege is
sometimes valuable to a defendant for this Court has held that such testimony alone, in some
circumstances, may be enough to raise a reasonable doubt of guilt.”).
131. Gifford, supra note 106, at 67.
132. Oren Gazal-Ayal & Avishalom Tor, The Innocence Effect, 62 DUKE L.J. 339, 396 (2012);
Gregory M. Gilchrist, Counsel’s Role in Bargaining for Trials, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1979, 1981-82
(2014); Fisher, supra note 30, at 945 (suggesting waiving the right to the criminal standard of
proof).
133. Bibas, supra note 3, at 1184-85.
134. Jennifer J. Llewellyn et al., Imagining Success for a Restorative Approach to Justice:
Implications for Measurement and Evaluation, 26 DALHOUSIE L.J. 281, 284 (2013).
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focuses upon relationships among the victim, the offender, and the
community. 135
Restorative justice allows the defendant to understand the human
side of the harm that was caused. 136 People’s attitudes following the
offense reflect the importance of the social norm violated. 137
Undoubtedly, an apology that is attendant upon repentance may
have a curative effect on the victim. 138 Many victims prefer forgiveness
over retribution. 139 Plea bargaining negotiations may provide an
excellent opportunity for a remedial offender-victim encounter. 140 The
prosecutor could simply enter the victim into the dialogue with the
defendant in appropriate cases and at the appropriate time.
The process of restorative justice normally depends on the consent
of the victim. 141 This is a serious flaw. It is claimed that taking the
victim’s position toward the defendant into account has nothing to do
with the search for justice. The fate of the defendant does not have to be
dependent on the position of one individual or another but on the degree
of the blameworthiness of the accused. 142
Nor should the victim determine the proper punishment. 143 Lacking
objectivity, the victim’s response is subjective and depends on his
personal characteristics, as well as the point in time in his life. 144 As
opposed to the prosecutor, the victim does not have to take into account
the public interest or the principle of proportionality in inflicting the
proper punishment. Hence, taking the victim’s view into account might
violate the equality requirement, which necessitates that two offenders
who committed the same offense with the same degree of culpability

135. Id. at 301.
136. Paul H. Robinson, The Virtues of Restorative Processes, The Vices of “Restorative
Justice”, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 375, 375 (2003).
137. Id.
138. Margareth Etienne & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law—the
Relationship Between Plea Bargaining and Criminal Code Structure: Victims, Apology, and
Restorative Justice in Criminal Procedure: Apologies and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 295,
295-97 (2007).
139. Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into
Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L. J. 85, 137 (2004).
140. Etienne & Robbennolt, supra note 138, at 298.
141. Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg & Tali Gal, Restorative Criminal Justice, 34 CARDOZO L. REV.
2313, 2343 (2013).
142. Robinson, supra note 136, at 381.
143. Michael Moore, Victims and Retribution: A Reply to Professor Fletcher, 3 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 65, 67 (1999).
144. John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized: Realistic or Utopian? 46
UCLA L. REV. 1727, 1744 (1999); Moore, supra note 143, at 75-76.
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deserve an identical punishment. 145 Additionally, repentance (of course,
by a guilty offender) should be encouraged, given the importance of
sincere repentance both to the offender and to society at large. 146 There
are victims, however, who are not satisfied by repentance; and
occasionally for very justifiable reasons, they are not interested in any
contact with the offender. The thought that a reluctant victim has a veto
over the fate of the offender, especially if the latter was trying to
partially repair the harm through repentance and making amends, may
discourage the offender from any attempt at rehabilitation.147
Dialogue between the prosecutor, who represents society, and the
defendant can take place even without the involvement of the victim.
Although not every victim—nor, for that matter, every offender—is
eligible for restorative justice processes, 148 dialogue between prosecutor
and defendant can almost always take place. Victimless offenses, such as
importing drugs or tax evasion, are an example. Some of the goals of
restorative justice may still be secured without a victim’s participation in
the process. When the prosecutor communicates to the defendant how
society perceives the offense and the harm caused to the victim, the
defendant can respond to the criticism. This dialogue may enable the
defendant to internalize the prosecutor’s perception, accepting
responsibility for the misdeed and understanding its wrongness. Direct
dialogue with the prosecutor, then, may inspire repentance and
modification of the defendant’s conduct.
Of course, face-to-face encounters in which the victim relates his
feelings about the offense can perhaps more deeply permeate the heart of
the defendant. However, the latter can also absorb the harm caused
through a third party who reflects the impact of the offense on the victim
and on other parties affected by the offense and tries to convey the
perspective of society and the victim alike.
Obviously, the plea negotiation process between the prosecutor and
the defendant does not rule out a restorative justice process with the
victim’s participation in appropriate cases.
Normally, it is easier for defendants to communicate their views to
a prosecutor outside of the trial process. In conversing with the
prosecutor, the defendant does not have to worry about what is said; his
145. Moore, supra note 143, at 77.
146. Rinat Kitai-Sangero & Itay Lipschits, The Place of Repentance in Retributive Sentencing,
7 IJPS 107, 108-09 (2011).
147. Id. at 120-21.
148. Cian Logan, Restorative Justice: Encouraging More Meaningful Engagement with the
Criminal Justice System, 13 U. C. DUBLIN L. REV. 39, 40 (2013).
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words will not militate against him because negotiations with the
prosecutor to establish a plea bargain are confidential. Defendants can
simply tell their own story from their own perspective. Even a person
with an extensive criminal record has a story; e.g., the circumstances that
led up to the offense. By listening, the prosecutor accords the defendant
respect. In this way, a dialogue with the prosecutor may empower the
defendant and reduce any sense of loss of control that is felt. Being a
partner in the dialogue imparts a sense of choice rather than a feeling of
coercion.
VI. POSSIBLE DRAWBACKS
The suggestion to establish a true dialogue between the defendant
and a representative of the prosecution’s office carries some drawbacks.
The following subsections will come to grips with them.
A. Time-Consuming
The main goal of plea bargaining is to clear dockets. Caseload
pressures render the suggestion to make a genuine dialogue with
defendants unattractive to prosecutors and defense counsel alike.
Overburdened prosecutors and defense counsel have no time for true
negotiations. 149 They want to move quickly to the next case. Obviously,
the prosecution may see no reason to devote resources to this purpose.
Moreover, it can be argued that the willingness of prosecutors to offer
plea bargains will be reduced in view of the effort required to conduct a
time-consuming dialogue. Many defense counsel, for their part, tend to
accept the prosecutor’s evaluations as to the appropriate punishment and
are not accustomed to, and perhaps are not interested in, negotiating with
the prosecutor adversarially. 150 Efficiency is an essential component of
the criminal justice system. 151 There is not sufficient time to treat every
defendant as unique. 152 As Markus Dubber observes, “[O]ffenders and
victims alike are irrelevant nuisances, grains of sand in the great
machine of state risk management.” 153
However, the time consumed by negotiations to obtain a guilty plea

149. Cf. Gilchrist, supra note 132, at 1997.
150. Gifford, supra note 106, at 51.
151. Mar Jimeno-Bulnes, American Criminal Procedure in a European Context, 21 CARDOZO
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 409, 458 (2013).
152. Taslitz, supra note 88, at 4, 18.
153. Markus Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal
Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 849 (2001).
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would be much shorter than the time consumed by cases that go to trial.
Communicating a defendant’s character and personal circumstances to
the prosecutor and communicating the prosecutor’s message regarding
the offense to the defendant would involve a reasonable expenditure of
time. Moreover, it involves neither witness inconvenience nor court
time.
B. Harming the Defense
It may be argued that the conduct of a true dialogue within the plea
bargaining process would be harmful to the defense in the event that
negotiations fail. In this case, the defendant’s attempt to claim innocence
or to raise arguments in her defense may actually be helpful to the
prosecution. Giving the prosecution advance knowledge of the central
arguments of the defense may buttress weaknesses in the prosecution’s
case, 154 and better prepare the prosecutor for trial. Additionally, prior
personal acquaintance with the defendant may provide the prosecutor
with an advantage in conducting cross-examination.
To ensure the exchange of information without fear of devastating
consequences, the plea bargaining negotiations with the defendant ought
to be conducted by a different prosecutor from the one who would
conduct the trial and should be confidential. Separating the prosecutor
who conducts the trial from the prosecutor who conducts the
negotiations will also create internal supervision within the prosecution
on the conduct and the content of the plea bargain. Concentrating too
much power in the hands of one prosecutor is generally not a desirable
situation. 155
C. Faking Good Character and Repentance
Scholars argue that one of the justifications for plea bargaining is
that it allows prosecutors to take human considerations into account 156
and, hence, to bypass the rigidity of the Sentencing Guidelines. 157
It may be argued, however, that laying stress on a dialogue that
provides the defendant with the opportunity to present his good qualities
154. Rebecca
Hollander-Blumoff,
Note,
Getting
to
“Guilty”: Plea
Bargaining as Negotiation, 2 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 115, 140 (1997).
155. See generally James Dowden, United States v. Singleton: A Warning Shot Heard Round
the Circuits? 40 B.C. L. REV. 897, 911 (1999); Langbein, supra note 4, at 18.
156. Zacharias, supra note 103, at 1136, 1161.
157. On this rigidity, see Stephen Schulhofer & Ilene Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the PostMistretta Period, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1304-08 (1997).
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may benefit manipulative defendants who succeed in deceiving with
their charm.
The defendant can simply fake repentance in order to gain a milder
punishment. 158 It is difficult to identify repentance or to evaluate its
sincerity. 159 After all, “if a jurisdiction reduces punishment for convicts
who express contrition, it invites a parade of purely instrumental
apologies into its sentencing procedures and risks rewarding the best
actors rather than the most transformed.” 160 At any rate, it is difficult to
assess a defendant’s traits in the short span of time available to become
familiar with him. 161
Additionally, most of an offender’s personal characteristics are not
relevant to sentencing. 162 However, defendants might prompt sympathy
for reasons unrelated to the degree of guilt or degree of dangerousness.
Sympathy and lack of sympathy for the defendant can be influenced by
irrelevant grounds, such as race, gender, religion, and the social class to
which the defendant belongs. 163 The danger that the defendant would
fake remorse or be judged by irrelevant criteria is not unique to plea
bargaining negotiations; it also exists at a trial. 164 Therefore, this
argument fails to undermine the process of a true dialogue with the
defendant. Moreover, if expressed repentance is revealed to be insincere,
it can hurt the victim and enhance the injury caused by this person in the
wake of the offense. 165 Such insincerity would not personally hurt—
certainly not to the same degree—the prosecutor who conducts the
negotiations with the defendant.
D. Exerting Pressures on Innocent Defendants
Scholars have discussed the danger of innocent defendants making
158. Cheryl G. Bader, “Forgive Me Victim for I Have Sinned”: Why Repentance and the
Offender Justice System Do Not Mix—A Lesson from Jewish Law, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 69, 94
(2003).
159. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Well Excuse Me!—Remorse, Apology, and Criminal Sentence, 38
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 371, 379 (2006).
160. Nick Smith, Just Apologies: An Overview of the Philosophical Issues, 13 PEPP. DISP.
RESOL. L. J. 35 68 (2013).
161. Michael M. O’Hear, Remorse, Cooperation, and “Acceptance of Responsibility”: The
Structure, Implementation, and Reform of Section 3e1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91
NW. U. L. REV. 1507, 1554-55 (1997).
162. Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 157, at 1305.
163. Id. at 1307 (relating to Sentencing pre-Guidelines).
164. Dancig-Rosenberg & Gal, supra note 141, at 2343; Kitai-Sangero & Lipschits, supra
note 146, at 121-28.
165. Lode Walgrave, Investigating the Potentials of Restorative Justice Practice, 36 WASH.
U.J.L. & POL’Y 91, 126 (2011).
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false guilty pleas as a result of plea bargaining. 166 Such defendants have
lost any confidence in their ability to be acquitted and so welcome any
suggestion of leniency. 167 Indeed, the leniency that the prosecution
normally offers makes a guilty plea an attractive option for risk-averse
defendants. And if, as has happened, the proposed plea bargain is very
lenient, the defendant may feel unable to take the risk of going to trial. 168
Innocent defendants may face an even greater temptation to admit guilt
than would guilty defendants because in light of the weakness of the
incriminating evidence, the prosecutor offers them an attractive plea
bargain that seems magnanimous and too good to turn down. 169 Thus,
increasing the attractiveness of plea bargains may have the adverse result
of pressuring innocent defendants to participate in plea bargaining
proceedings, thereby raising the risk of false convictions of innocent
defendants.
This concern has merit. However, there is hope that a true dialogue
between the defendant and the prosecutor will convince the latter of the
defendant’s innocence and bring about a dismissal of the indictment.
It should be recalled that defendants need to admit guilt in order to
participate in restorative justice processes. 170 In those proceedings, too,
there is the fear of a false confession by defendants. 171 In plea bargaining
negotiations as dialogue, the admission of guilt does not constitute a
precondition for participation.
VII. CONCLUSION
Filing charges against a person alienates that individual from
society. It makes the individual feel like a child, standing helpless
against the greater power of adults. Throughout this Article, the
protagonist of Camus’ The Stranger, Meursault, who is excluded from

166. Gazal-Ayal, supra note 6, at 2298; Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea
Bargaining with Plea-Based Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1239 (2008).
167. Andrew D. Leipold, How Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful Convictions, 42 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1154 (2005).
168. CASPER, supra note 25, at 74; Leipold, supra note 167, at 1154.
169. The Prosecutor’s Role, supra note 6, at 61; Gifford, supra note 106, at 60; Phil Fennell et
al., Book Review, Craig M. Bradley, The Convergence of the Continental and the Common Law
Model of Criminal Procedure, 7 CRIM. L.F. 471, 474 (1996); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of
Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1535 (1981); Langer, supra note 117, at n. 240;
Gazal-Ayal, supra note 6, at 2298-99; Samuel R. Gross, Pretrial Incentives, Post-Conviction
Review, and Sorting Criminal Prosecutions by Guilt or Innocence, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1009,
1015-16 (2011-12).
170. Dancig-Rosenberg & Gal, supra note 141, at 2320.
171. Id. at 2322-23.
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both trial and life, 172 has served as an example of this feeling of
alienation. To help the defendant overcome this feeling, an accused
individual should be treated respectfully, including the ability to
reference made to his unique positive characteristics. Most importantly,
the defendant should be allowed to take an active part in the criminal
proceedings being conducted against him. 173
In The Stranger, everyone has something to say about the defendant
except for the defendant himself. 174 When he does speak, his words are
seen as irrelevant. No one is listening or trying to understand what he is
saying. His explanations are ignored or ridiculed. When Meursault says
he killed because of the sun, he is mocked. The defense attorney quickly
silences him and forces him to stay passive. No one attempts to find out
what he meant. In fact, he does not participate in the trial. The lawyer
speaks on his behalf.
According to the adage, if you cannot beat them, join them. Given
the ubiquity of plea bargaining and the fact that eradication of this
process is not feasible in the foreseeable future, we should strive to
derive the utmost benefit from this legal vehicle. Defendants’ perception
of fairness is crucial to the legitimacy of the legal decision in their eyes.
If defendants experience the procedure of plea bargaining as unfair, the
legitimacy of legal authorities may be decreased and the defendants’
readiness to obey the law attenuated.175 People need to feel that what
they say could have an influence on the outcome of the trial. 176 Plea
bargaining can and should be a device for empowerment. Case load
pressure notwithstanding, defendants should be key players in the
criminal justice proceedings to which they are subjected. Dispute
settlement is an important component of doing justice. To this end, plea
bargaining offers a unique opportunity to enable defendants participating
in the process to bypass the prohibition of introducing character
evidence, and to circumvent the need for the victim’s consent in
restorative justice. Only a dialogic process may be meaningful for
defendants if we want them to learn a lesson from their trial and to
modify their conduct. Such a dialogue helps decrease the feeling of
alienation that defendants normally experience, since it reflects a respect
for human dignity. It is worth the price of rendering plea bargaining a bit
172. David Carroll, Guilt by “Race”: Injustice in Camus’s The Stranger, 26 CARDOZO L. REV.
2331, 2340 (2005).
173. Ronner, supra note 12, at 50.
174. Carroll, supra note 172, at 2340.
175. TYLER, supra note 10, at 110.
176. Id. at 127.
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more complex.
The ubiquity and plasticity of plea bargaining gives us the
opportunity to shape new rules for the criminal justice process. With the
new rules, Meursault’s urgent appeal “[i]t’s a serious matter for a man,
being accused of murder. And I’ve something really important to tell
you,” 177 should receive a significant response during the plea bargaining
process. Plea bargaining proceedings should heighten defendants’
participation in the process and convey to them an educational message.
Waiving one’s right to a day in court does not imply waiving being
addressed as a human being rather than as a number.

177.
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